If SBOMs are “just files,” the SBOM program will eventually collapse under its own weight.
Not because SBOM generation is hard - it isn’t.
Because SBOM operations is a lifecycle problem.
In the previous post, we framed SBOMs as supply-chain control: not documentation, but a system you can trust under pressure. This post is the practical follow-up: the five stages every SBOM program moves through, where teams break down, and what “good” looks like.
The SBOM lifecycle in one line
Generate → Store → Validate → Share → Monitor
If any stage is missing (or treated casually), you’ll see the symptoms:
- inconsistent SBOMs
- stale SBOMs
- supplier friction
- “can you resend that?” churn
- audit anxiety
- slow incident response
Let’s break down each stage, and the common failure points.
1) Generate: produce SBOMs you can trace back to the build
Goal: every shipped artifact has an SBOM you can tie to reality.
Most teams generate SBOMs in one of three ways:
- CI/CD step during build
- post-build scan of artifacts/images
- developer workstation/manual generation (avoid if you can)
What matters isn’t the tool, it’s whether you can answer:
- Which product/repo does this SBOM belong to?
- Which version/release does it map to?
- Which build produced it?
- What scope did it cover (source, dependencies, container layers, OS packages)?
Common failure points
- “One-off generation”: created for a customer request, never maintained.
- No mapping to shipped artifacts: SBOM exists, but you can’t prove it matches what shipped.
- Inconsistent formats across teams/products (or no standard at all).
- No ownership: everyone assumes “someone else” is maintaining SBOMs.
What good looks like (minimum)
- SBOMs are generated automatically at build time (or reliably after build)
- SBOM includes release/build metadata or can be associated with it
- You have a repeatable pipeline that produces the same result given the same inputs
Rule of thumb: If you can’t map SBOMs to releases, everything downstream becomes guesswork.
2) Store: centralize SBOMs into an inventory, not a folder
Goal: one source of truth that people can actually use.
Teams often “store SBOMs” by:
- attaching them to tickets
- committing them to repos
- emailing them
- dumping them into shared drives
That’s storage, but it’s not inventory.
An inventory gives you:
- searchability (by product/version/component)
- history (what changed over time)
- governance (access control, audit trails)
- operational workflows (requests, approvals, evidence)
Common failure points
- Multiple sources of truth: repo copy vs emailed copy vs portal copy.
- No history: you can’t diff or explain changes between releases.
- Not queryable: “we have SBOMs” but nobody can answer impact quickly.
What good looks like (minimum)
- Central SBOM inventory with consistent metadata
- Versioned SBOMs (keep every release, not just “latest”)
- Clear naming/mapping scheme (product, version, artifact)
Rule of thumb: If SBOMs aren’t queryable, they aren’t operational.
3) Validate: enforce quality gates before anyone relies on SBOMs
Goal: SBOMs meet minimum requirements and are internally trustworthy.
Validation is the moment your SBOM program becomes a control.
There are two types of checks:
- Schema validity (does it parse, does it conform to your chosen format)
- Policy validity (does it meet your organization’s acceptance criteria)
Common failure points
- “Looks fine to me” validation (manual spot-checks)
- Accepting supplier SBOMs blindly (garbage in, garbage out)
- No defined acceptance criteria (so every customer request is a scramble)
What to validate (practical starter pack)
- required fields present (component IDs, supplier, timestamps, licenses)
- dependency completeness (not only top-level)
- uniqueness/consistency of identifiers
- scope is clear (what’s included/excluded)
- format + version are acceptable
Rule of thumb: If you don’t gate quality, your program will fail at the first audit or incident.
4) Share: exchange SBOMs securely, with least disclosure and proof
Goal: share what’s needed, with the right party, and be able to prove it.
SBOM sharing is where “file thinking” hurts the most.
Because as soon as you start sharing SBOMs externally:
- you’re handling sensitive detail (IP + attack surface)
- you’re dealing with legal/commercial boundaries
- you need traceability (who got what, when)
Common failure points
- Email attachments and “resend please” loops
- Over-sharing (customer gets more than necessary)
- Under-sharing (SBOM too redacted or incomplete to be useful)
- No audit trail (can’t prove delivery or access)
What good looks like
- workflows: request → approve → deliver → log
- access control by role/attribute (customer vs regulator vs supplier)
- least disclosure / redaction rules
- exportable evidence (for audits and customer questionnaires)
Rule of thumb: If you can’t prove what you shared, you don’t control your SBOM program.
5) Monitor: keep SBOMs current and usable during “high-pressure moments”
Goal: SBOMs reduce uncertainty when something changes.
Monitoring is what turns SBOMs into a living security asset:
- new vulnerability appears
- new license risk appears
- a supplier updates a component
- a product release changes dependencies
Monitoring can be lightweight to start:
- diff SBOMs between releases
- detect new components/licenses
- track changes in risk exposure
Common failure points
- Staleness: SBOM exists, but doesn’t represent current shipped reality
- No diffing: can’t answer “what changed since last release?”
- No operational loop: findings don’t trigger action (tickets, ownership, SLA)
What good looks like
- change tracking across versions
- alerts or reports that map to real action
- evidence that your process is continuous, not one-off
Rule of thumb: If SBOMs don’t speed up incident response, they’re not operational yet.
The lifecycle is only as strong as the weakest link
Most SBOM programs break at:
- Store (no inventory) and
- Share (no controlled exchange)
That’s why teams end up with SBOM chaos: SBOMs exist, but they don’t behave like a system.
If you want a simple way to start improving immediately:
A 30-minute self-assessment (fast)
Pick one product. Answer these 10 questions:
- Can we produce an SBOM for the latest release in under 10 minutes?
- Can we prove it maps to the shipped artifact?
- Is it stored in a single system (not scattered)?
- Can we find it by product + version quickly?
- Can we diff it against the previous release?
- Do we have written acceptance criteria?
- Do we automatically validate schema + minimum fields?
- Can we share it with least disclosure?
- Can we prove who accessed/shared it (audit trail)?
- Can we show evidence of continuous operation (not one-off)?
Wherever you said “no” - that’s your next step.
What’s next in the series
Next post: NTIA minimum elements vs. an SBOM that’s actually useful
…and the practical “acceptance criteria” we’d enforce so SBOMs don’t become paperwork.
Want help operationalizing the full lifecycle?
Exodos Labs is built to centralize SBOM inventory, enforce quality gates, and enable secure SBOM exchange with audit-ready evidence. (Start Free Tier / Request Enterprise Trial)
